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Abstract:  The occurrence of workplace accidents is described within the context of self-
organized criticality, a theory from statistical physics that governs a wide range of phenomena 
across physics, biology, geosciences, economics, and the social sciences.  Workplace accident 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal a power-law relationship between the 
number of accidents and their severity as measured by the number of days lost from work.  This 
power-law scaling is indicative of workplace accidents being governed by self-organized 
criticality, suggesting that nearly all workplace accidents have a common underlying cause, 
independent of their severity.  Such power-law scaling is found for all labor categories 
documented by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Our results provide scientific support for the 
Heinrich accident triangle, with the practical implication that suppressing the rate of severe 
accidents requires changing the attitude toward workplace safety in general.  By creating a 
culture that values safety, empowers individuals, and strives to continuously improve, accident 
rates can be suppressed across the full range of severities.  
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I. Introduction 
Despite significant progress over the past several decades, the occurrence of workplace 
accidents remains an unfortunate reality [1], with over 900,000 lost-time accidents reported in 
the U.S. in 2015 alone [2].  Workplace accidents span the full range of severity from minor 
injuries such as cuts or scrapes to fatalities.  Of course, minor incidents occur much more 
frequently than major ones.  In order to understand the origin of the most serious accidents, we 
must consider the statistics of rare events, an important subject in statistical physics with a wide 
range of applications across a variety of disciplines. 
One of the most successful physical theories to describe the statistics of rare events is that 
of self-organized criticality.  Self-organized criticality was proposed by the late Danish physicist 
Per Bak in 1987 as a means for explaining how complex behavior in nature can arise from 
relatively simple origins [3]-[5].  Bak and coworkers originally proposed the concept of self-
organized criticality to explain the distribution of avalanche sizes in a sandpile [3].  Bak 
considered a sandpile where individual grains are slowly sprinkled on top.  Most of the time, the 
individual grains just add to the growing pile.  However, sometimes a grain creates a large 
enough perturbation to generate a landslide.  The size of the landslide can be measured by the 
number of grains of sand involved, and smaller landslides occur much more frequently than 
larger landslides.  Of course, the occurrence of larger landslides will have a greater impact on the 
structure of the sandpile.  Given their much lower frequency of occurrence, the study of the 
probability of these larger landslides is an example of the statistics of rare events, which is 
addressed directly by Bak’s theory of self-organized criticality. 
The concept of self-organized criticality has several important implications.  First, it 
entails the natural emergence of a power-law distribution to describe the frequency of events as a 
function of size, 
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N(x) = ax-k, (1) 
 
where N is the number of occurrences of an event of size x, a is a proportionality factor, and k is 
a scaling exponent.  The power-law distribution gives a characteristic straight line when plotted 
on log-log axes, i.e., when plotting the logarithm of the number of occurrences versus the 
logarithm of the avalanche size, as 
 
 log N = log a – k log x. (2) 
 
With such a log-log plot, the slope of the line reveals the value of the scaling exponent, k. 
A second major insight from self-organized criticality is that all of the observed critical 
events have a common underlying origin, independent of their size.  For the case of sandpiles, 
each landslide is caused by a perturbation induced by an individual falling grain of sand.  The 
larger landslides occur much less frequently than the smaller landslides, but they all have the 
same fundamental cause.  The term “self-organized” is used because the same scaling behavior 
emerges naturally, regardless of variation in the individual parameters of the experiment or the 
model. 
Finally, a third major insight from self-organized criticality is its widespread applicability 
across a diverse range of fields, including physics, geology, materials science, biology, 
mathematics, economics, and even sociology [6]-[7].  An archetypal example from geology is 
the statistics of earthquake magnitudes [8].  All earthquakes have the same fundamental origin, 
i.e., a rock breaking along a fault line, which generates seismic waves.  Low-magnitude 
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earthquakes occur frequently, although we usually do not notice since they are too small to be 
felt.  The earthquakes of greater concern are the more rarely occurring high-magnitude 
earthquakes that can create massive damage and loss of human life.  The probability of these 
high-magnitude earthquakes occurring is another example of the statistics of rare events.  Since 
all earthquakes have the same underlying origin, the frequency of earthquakes of varying 
magnitude follows a power-law distribution, the same distribution that describes the statistics of 
landslides in Bak’s study of sandpiles.  In this manner, both landslides and earthquakes are 
examples of self-organized criticality.  
 Other examples of phenomena described by self-organized criticality include forest fires, 
river flows, climatology, disease epidemics, financial markets, and social networks [6]-[7].  Self-
organized criticality also describes the evolution of complex proteins in the field of biology [9]-
[10].  Within materials science, self-organized criticality explains the existence of optimized 
stress-free glasses that exhibit a minimum in aging behavior [11].  In the social and economic 
sciences, self-organized criticality explains the probability distributions of wars and stock market 
crashes [6]. 
Here we propose that workplace accidents are another example of self-organized 
criticality.  Workplace accident data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal a power-law 
distribution of accident rates as a function of the number of days lost from work, a quantitative 
measure of the severity of an accident.  As a characteristic feature of self-organized criticality, 
this power-law scaling points to a common underlying cause of workplace accidents, 
independent of their severity and the particular labor category in which they occur.  We propose 
that the most effective means of reducing the rate of severe accidents in the workplace is to 
reduce the accident rate overall by creating a culture that incorporates safety as one of its core 
 5 
 
values.  This result is consistent with the approach advocated by Heinrich [12] and provides a 
scientific basis for Heinrich’s empirically derived accident triangle. 
  
II. Methods 
 The data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of 
Labor), gathered through the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses in cooperation with 
participating state agencies.  Here we consider the distribution of nonfatal injuries resulting in at 
least one day lost from work.  Table I provides the raw data used for our study [2] for 28 
different labor categories.  The first row is the combined set of data for all private industry in the 
U.S. 
The power-law distribution of Eq. (1) is independently fit to each row of data in Table I 
to determine the optimized values of a and k using a least squares method.  For the columns in 
Table I where the reported data are binned across multiple days, we consider an average number 
of accidents at the midpoint of the reported range of days.  The final column of data for 31 or 
more lost days of work is not used for curve fitting, since the upper bound of the number of days 
is unknown and a midpoint cannot be determined.  The quality of the power-law fits is quantified 
by the standard coefficient of determination, R2.  The optimized parameters, a and k, and the R2 
values for each labor category are provided in Table II. 
 
III. Results 
 The power-law distribution provides an excellent fit to all of the workplace accident data 
across all labor categories, as the R2 values are above 0.9 in all cases and above 0.95 for most 
categories.  Since the R2 values represent the proportion of the variance in the workplace 
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accident rates that are predictable from the power-law distribution, more than 90% of the 
variation in accident rates with severity can be explained by a power-law model.  Figure 1 plots 
the power-law distribution for the total number of workplace accidents across all of private 
industry.  The R2 value for the power-law fit is 0.977, indicating that it is an excellent description 
of the workplace accident distribution.  
Figure 2 shows power-law distributions for two of the individual labor categories from 
Table I: “Servicing Providing” and “Management of Companies and Enterprises.”  Both sectors 
exhibit power-law scaling with R2 > 0.975.  The slopes are nearly identical, with k ≈ 1.02 in both 
cases, indicating that the average number of days lost from a particular workplace accident is 
roughly the same in both labor categories.  The only difference in the two distributions is a 
vertical shift in Fig. 2 owing to the much larger workforce population in the “Service Providing” 
sector.  The fact that the workplace accident data in both of these independent labor sectors—and 
in every category under study—are so well described by power-law distributions is strong 
evidence for the self-organized nature of workplace accident statistics.  Indeed, the high R2 
values for the power-law fits in every category in Table II indicates that the power-law 
distribution emerges naturally for any category of labor. 
While most of the labor categories exhibit power-law scaling of workplace accidents with 
k values near 1.0, a few categories show moderate departure either above or below this exponent 
value.  Two of these are plotted in Fig. 3, which shows the distribution of workplace accidents 
for the “Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” category, exhibiting a higher exponent of k = 
1.147, and for the “Mining” category, which has a lower exponent of k = 0.761.  A smaller 
exponent indicates a greater average number of days lost in a workplace accident; hence, 
individual mining accidents are, on average, more severe than accidents that occur in the arts, 
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entertainment, and recreation industry.  However, it is important to note that even with these 
differences in slope, a power-law distribution with high R2 values emerges for both of these 
completely independent and unrelated job categories. 
 
IV. Discussion 
 The power law scaling of workplace accident frequency with severity across all job 
categories considered by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is a strong indication that workplace 
accidents are governed by self-organized criticality.  The practical implication of this result is 
that nearly all workplace accidents have a common underlying cause, i.e., the same conditions, 
attitudes, behaviors, etc., that lead to common (minor) workplace injuries also yield the less 
frequent major injuries.  Thus, in order to suppress the occurrence of major accidents, we must 
focus on reducing the entire distribution of accident rates.  By reducing the rate of minor 
accidents, the entire distribution will be suppressed, i.e., the rate of major accidents and fatalities 
will decrease. 
If all workplace accidents have a common underlying origin, then the only way to 
effectively reduce accident rates is to identify and address this cause.  Heinrich’s studies have 
shown that workplace accidents can be traced back to unsafe acts related to job hazards or 
worker behaviors [12].  The existence of such unchecked hazards and unsafe actions is a direct 
result of the culture of the organization.  Does the organization value safety, and does it translate 
that value into action?  To reduce accident rates overall, organizations must strive to create a 
workplace culture where safety is one of its core values among all levels of management, with 
top management setting expectations and leading by example, and among workers in all roles in 
the organization. 
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In creating this culture where safety is a core value, particular emphasis should be placed 
on identifying and addressing the “minor” issues that are systemic of a potentially dangerous 
workplace.  These minor issues, which can be as seemingly benign as issues related to 
housekeeping and organization, occur the most frequently in the workplace and are therefore the 
best candidates for addressing directly through proper awareness and training.  By creating a 
culture that recognizes and rectifies even small safety-related concern, the accident rates should 
decrease across the full range of severities.  Creating such a culture is a journey, not a 
destination, in that continuous improvement is necessary, with a belief and attitude toward safety 
that stretches beyond simply being compliant.  This approach is also consistent with the desire to 
move from “lagging” indicators such as accident rate statistics toward “leading” indicators such 
as the predictive assessment of the safety climate of an organization [13]. 
Our results are consistent with the Heinrich’s pioneering research into workplace 
accident statistics [12].  Heinrich proposed an “accident triangle” describing how the number of 
severe accidents occurs much less frequently compared to that of minor incidents.  Heinrich 
proposed that nearly all accidents have a common underlying cause related to unsafe actions and 
hazards in the workplace.  Heinrich’s work has had an enormous influence on thinking around 
workplace safety for many decades, but recently it has been criticized by some as being 
“unscientific” [14].  For example, Anderson and Denkl have argued that Heinrich’s Law only 
applies to aggregate data and not to individual activities and that separate efforts should be 
specifically devoted to high-risk activities [15].  Our results herein give scientific support to 
Heinrich’s postulate of a common origin for workplace accidents since the accident statistics in 
all occupation categories—including higher-risk occupation such as mining—demonstrate a 
power law distribution indicative of self-organized criticality. 
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V. Conclusions 
 The statistics of rare events is a major concern for a variety of applications in physics, 
biology, geology, and across a wide range of social sciences.  While initially developed to 
describe the distribution of landslides occurring in sandpiles, self-organized criticality has found 
far-reaching applications throughout the natural and social sciences.  A key feature of self-
organized criticality is the emergence of power-law scaling for the frequency of events as a 
function of size or severity, independent of the specific parameters of the experiment.  In this 
work we have considered the statistics of workplace accident frequency as a function of the time 
lost from work for 28 different labor categories, as tabulated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  In every category, the distributions are well described by a power-law model; the 
emergence of power-law scaling independent of labor category is a strong indication that 
workplace accidents are the result of self-organized criticality.  This points to a common 
underlying cause for nearly all workplace accidents, irrespective of their severity.  This result is 
analogous to that obtained, e.g., for the distribution of landslide sizes in sandpiles or the 
frequency of earthquakes as a function of seismic magnitude.  Just as self-organized criticality 
explains that all landslides and earthquakes have a common underlying cause, independent of 
their magnitude, we can also arrive at the practical conclusion that workplace accidents are 
caused by common underlying factors. 
Thus, in order to reduce the rate of major accidents and fatalities, a workplace culture 
needs to be advanced that addresses all accidents, not just the most severe.  By focusing on 
creating an attitude and culture of safety and addressing common minor problems such as 
housekeeping and cleanliness issues, consistent proper use of personal protective equipment, 
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etc., the rate of accidents as a whole will be brought down.  We hope that the insights provided 
by this physics-bases analysis and interpretation will provide an explanation for why focusing on 
creating a safety-oriented culture is the most effective strategy for reducing accident rates of all 
levels of severity, in agreement with the arguments made by Heinrich and other researchers in 
the safety science community [16]-[17]. 
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Table I.  Number of workplace accidents leading to different number of days away from work [2]. 
  
Days Away from Work Cases Involving 
   
 
Total Cases 1 2 3 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 30 31 or More 
Private Industry 902,160 127,610 100,510 156,430 104,900 96,590 57,800 258,330 
Goods Producing 226,320 30,660 23,050 36,930 25,030 25,450 15,060 70,140 
Natural Resources and Mining 23,830 2,900 2,810 4,230 3,390 2,370 1,520 6,610 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 18,660 2,490 2,540 3,750 2,700 1,890 1,170 4,130 
Mining 5,160 410 270 470 690 480 350 2,490 
Construction 79,890 9,780 7,520 12,470 7,920 9,060 5,410 27,720 
Manufacturing 122,610 17,980 12,720 20,230 13,720 14,020 8,130 35,800 
Service Providing 675,840 96,950 77,460 119,500 79,870 71,130 42,740 188,190 
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 279,150 35,360 26,830 44,560 31,780 31,110 18,810 90,700 
Utilities 4,060 280 240 610 440 600 310 1,580 
Wholesale Trade 60,340 8,790 6,570 9,960 6,570 6,450 3,720 18,290 
Retail Trade 123,770 19,550 14,150 22,470 14,050 12,900 8,150 32,510 
Transportation and Warehousing 90,990 6,750 5,870 11,520 10,720 11,160 6,640 38,330 
Information 14,050 1,300 1,300 1,900 1,490 1,440 770 5,860 
Financial Activities 30,110 4,090 3,920 5,330 3,600 2,020 1,680 9,470 
Finance and Insurance 9,480 1,600 1,120 1,140 740 730 940 3,200 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 20,630 2,490 2,800 4,190 2,860 1,290 740 6,270 
Professional and Business Services 67,320 10,600 8,160 12,060 7,190 6,310 4,430 18,550 
Professional and Technical Services 18,030 4,340 2,350 3,170 2,070 940 1,310 3,860 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 5,700 1,000 510 950 720 820 310 1390 
Administrative and Waste Services 43,590 5,260 5,310 7,940 4,400 4,550 2,820 13,310 
Educational and Health Services 168,940 26,740 21,660 32,500 22,350 17,940 9,470 38,270 
Educational Services 10,530 1,820 1,650 1,880 1,240 1,270 410 2,270 
Health Care and Social Assistance 158,410 24,930 20,010 30,620 21,110 16,670 9,060 36,010 
Leisure and Hospitality 92,670 15,170 12,340 18,610 10,850 9,520 5,960 20,220 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 14,110 2,630 1,790 2,530 1,810 1,510 680 3,180 
Accommodation and Food Services 78,560 12,540 10,550 16,080 9,040 8,010 5,290 17,040 
Other Services, Except Public Administration 23,600 3,690 3,250 4,530 2,610 2,800 1,600 5,120 
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Table II.  Parameters for optimized power-law fits using Eq. (1) and the data provided in Table 
I.  R2 is the coefficient of determination and represents the proportion of the variance in the 
workplace accident rate that is predictable from the power-law distribution.   
 
 
a k R2 
Private Industry 168,352 1.014 0.977 
Goods Producing 38,732 0.978 0.982 
Natural Resources and Mining 4,306 0.989 0.951 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 3,871 1.034 0.946 
Mining 456 0.761 0.957 
Construction 12,268 0.944 0.980 
Manufacturing 22,130 0.996 0.986 
Service Providing 129,696 1.026 0.976 
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 44,838 0.952 0.981 
Utilities 366 0.688 0.930 
Wholesale Trade 11,229 1.027 0.983 
Retail Trade 24,912 1.043 0.982 
Transportation and Warehousing 8,713 0.740 0.960 
Information 1,871 0.928 0.957 
Financial Activities 6,220 1.117 0.948 
Finance and Insurance 1,675 1.023 0.942 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 4,614 1.194 0.914 
Professional and Business Services 13,827 1.067 0.977 
Professional and Technical Services 4,908 1.228 0.955 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 1,105 1.020 0.980 
Administrative and Waste Services 7,727 1.001 0.954 
Educational and Health Services 37,537 1.083 0.970 
Educational Services 2,732 1.189 0.959 
Health Care and Social Assistance 34,841 1.077 0.970 
Leisure and Hospitality 20,819 1.080 0.972 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 3,437 1.147 0.982 
Accommodation and Food Services 17,386 1.069 0.969 
Other Services, Except Public Administration 5,063 1.045 0.971 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.  Power-law distribution of the number of workplace accidents in all private industry as 
a function of the number of days missed from work. 
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Figure 2.  The distributions of workplace accidents in the “Servicing Providing” and 
“Management of Companies and Enterprises” sectors exhibit power-law scaling with nearly 
identical exponents. 
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Figure 3.  Power-law distribution of the number of workplace accidents in the “Arts, 
Entertainment, and Recreation” category, which exhibits a large exponent, compared to number 
of workplace accidents in the “Mining” category, which exhibits a smaller exponent.  A smaller 
exponent indicates a greater average number of days lost in mining accidents compared to 
accidents in the arts, entertainment, and recreation industry. 
 
